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The introduction of liberal 
reforms has been a slow process 
of debate and negotiation 
beginning from the early 
1980s. The economic benefi ts of 
liberalisation were experienced 
after 2003 and yet, 1991 is 
popularly perceived as the year of 
liberalisation. This article charts 
the changing public discourse 
around reforms in national 
English-language newspapers and 
argues that they played a key role 
in popularising liberalisation for 
the elites.
Firmly embedded in the educated Indian’s mind is the year of liber-alisation, 1991. It was the year that 
India broke away from the “licence per-
mit quota raj” (Times of India, 1 Decem-
ber 1989), “socialist ideology” (Hindu,  2 
April 1985), “corruption and ineffi ciency” 
 (Hindu, 17 July  1991) and brought in 
“revolutionary changes to free the econ-
omy and make it outwards looking” 
(Times of  India, 24 March  1985), and 
“increased the effi ciency and inter-
national competitiveness of industrial 
production” (Hindu, 22 July  1991) and 
“imparted a new element of dynamism to 
growth processes in our economy” (Times 
of India, 24 July  1991). This  narrative of 
transition and change is sharply disso-
nant with the process of liberalisation 
undergone by the Indian economy.
There were no references in English-
language national newspapers in 1991 
about the green revolution  package be-
ing one of the fi rst large-scale liberal 
 reforms introduced in the eco nomy in 
1965–66; or that partial liberalisation 
measures had been introduced in the 
1980s itself; or that the pace of liberali-
sation has been so slow and strongly de-
bated, that even 25 years after liber-
alisation we continue to be one of the 
most insular high-growth countries. 
More over, the economy did not grow 
spectacularly in the 1990s as had been 
proclaimed. In fact, the 1980s was one of 
the highest economic growth periods 
experienced by the economy. The real 
take-off in growth, private investments, 
and exports happened after 2003, 
more than a decade after liberalisation. 
And yet the public imagination perceives 
1991 as the turning point, dividing 
the old Indian economy from the 
new one. 
This article traces some of the chang-
ing rhetoric and frames around which 
liberalisation is discussed in English-
language newspapers in India and arg-
ues that this change set the terms of 
 debate and critiques of liberal reforms. 
This is an important question as it has 
been well established (Vakulabharanam 
2005; Motiram and Vakulabharanam 
2012) that liberal reforms contributed to 
increasing inequality, neglect of the 
 agricultural sector and immiserisation 
of landless peasants. However, the redis-
tributive consequences of liberal reforms 
were not discussed in newspaper re-
portage on liberal reforms. Moreover, 
contemporary public discourse has ten-
ded to explain the high growth achieved 
by the economy after 2003 as a conse-
quence of liberal reforms but has bla-
med increasing inequality as a short-
coming of government social policy. 
This tendency to judge reforms on 
growth and investment criteria and 
not confl ate it with any redistributive 
consequences is a consequence of how 
reforms were framed by infl uential 
 English-language newspapers in 1991.
This article will be structured in the 
following way. First, it will be argued 
that the importance of the private media 
grew over the 1980s, creating the politi-
cal economy conditions for newspapers 
to infl uence public discourse on liberal 
reforms. Second, it will theorise how chan-
ging frames of public discourse can change 
the understanding of a policy for its reader. 
Third, it will chart the changing rhetoric 
around liberal reforms from 1985 to 1991 
and establish that the rhetoric had 
changed quite substantially. It will then 
conclude that this changing rhetoric was 
benefi cial to large businesses and media 
houses which gained immensely from 
liberal reforms. Given the size and scope of 
this article, it is not possible to establish 
evidence from all sections of the media. 
However, the author hopes that within 
the limits of this article, the reader will 
gain a novel theoretical perspective about 
the structural and political factors that 
shaped the introduction of liberal re-
forms in India at a time when there was 
suffi cient political  resistance against it.
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Upon independence, it was decided 
that the media in India should be infor-
mational and educational. This was in-
fl uenced by Gandhian ideals of frugality 
in consumption, and newspapers (ex-
cept a few large English-language dai-
lies) did not accept advertisements 
(Rajagopal 2009: 10). News was not 
treated as a commodity to be marketed 
and sold.  The “Indian nationalist saw 
the establishment and enhancement of 
the Indian  nation as the aim of the media 
and the principal criterion for assessing 
it” (Rajagopal 2009: 11). The mass media 
was largely controlled directly by the 
state. The government was the only 
broadcaster in radio and television, 
since its introduction in the 1970s. Many 
private newspapers existed, but the 
government rationed newsprint, which 
affected the pricing of newspapers. 
Changing Mass Media
Robin Jeffrey (2010: 169) has written at 
length about the changing impact of 
mass media in Indian political economy 
with the commercialisation of the mass 
media. He has argued that most of the 
media was not commercialised till the 
1980s, and except for some national 
English- language newspapers, advertis-
ers were hesitant to advertise in papers. 
Further, he argues that the Indian gov-
ernment was the largest advertiser, and 
newspapers adhered to government 
regulation of content to gain advertis-
ing revenue. Private newspapers had 
the freedom to  determine content. 
However, they were dependent on the 
state for newsprint and advertisements. 
This functioned as a mode of increased 
control on newspaper content after 
 independence, culminating in its com-
plete control during the Emergency. 
The end of the Emergency in 1977 coin-
cides with the growing importance of 
the private media. Multiple factors con-
tributed to the growth of the private 
media, which would over-take the size 
and importance of the public media by 
the 1990s.
Middle-class consciousness: The exce-
sses of the Emergency imposed in 1977 
led to the creation of a national middle-
class consciousness. This was especially 
true for an expanding group of educated 
youth who were born after independence, 
and had actively participated in the 
movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan. 
They felt a growing alienation towards 
large-scale state- controlled development 
programmes and the public discourse 
around sacrifi ces and socialism. Moreover, 
there was a growing distrust of informa-
tion provided by the public media. This 
class had a keen desire for gadgets and 
conveniences, a strong  aspiration to work 
abroad and felt incre asing frustration 
with socialist ideals (Thomas 2010: 178). 
This growing educated group would be 
an important audi ence for the private me-
dia in the 1980s.
Expanding vernacular media: Except 
for a few large English-language dailies, 
advertisers had stayed away from news-
papers because of the perceived low rate 
of readership in India. The Emergency 
brought an increased public demand for 
private newspapers, as well as an in-
creased consciousness amongst adv-
ertisers about the reach of newspapers, 
especially the vernacular ones.
A key element in fostering this awareness 
was the National Readership Survey II 
(NRS–II) in 1978, the year after the ‘Emer-
gency’ ended. Sponsored by advertisers and 
 advertising agencies. … NRS II estimated a 
two-third increase in urban readers since 
1970 and hinted strongly at a great untapped 
pool of readers—and potential consumers. 
(Thomas 2010: 179)
Most unexpectedly, it showed that the 
largest growth in readership had been in 
class III towns.
Improvement in printing technology: 
With the discovery of large markets 
in towns and semi-urban areas, news-
papers started investing in revolutionis-
ing technology. Once, one newspaper in 
a region showed that it could win sub-
stantial revenues in a region, other 
newspapers had to compete or risk fail-
ure. The media sector was one of the 
fi rst sectors where competition and a 
high rate of  return gave incentives for 
fi rms to innovate. This would typify the 
media industry after liberalisation as 
companies would try to capture markets 
from each other through advertising 
and innovation.
Media–business–politics nexus: Ver-
nacular newspapers provided a forum to 
create a regional identity. Some notable 
examples of the growing political infl u-
ence and commercial viability of vernac-
ular newspapers are Eenadu and Sun TV. 
Eenadu, a Telugu-language daily, and its 
proprietor Ramoji Rao not only fi nan-
cially supported the Telugu Desam Party 
(TDP), but were also involved in creating 
an environment conducive for TDP to 
sweep power from the Congress. More-
over, the offi ce spaces, printers and per-
sonnel of Eenadu often provided the ba-
sic infrastructure for the TDP in its em-
bryonic stages (Thomas 2010: 76). More 
recently, the owners of Sun TV, the 
 Marans, have played a similar role for 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’s (DMK) 
rise to power in Tamil Nadu. Sometimes, 
the sheer reach and strength of a news-
paper in the public imagination could 
 affect the political situation of the state. 
The Punjab Kesari became the highest 
circulating Hindi-language newspaper in 
1986 on the strength of its anti-Khalistan 
discourse. The power of vernacular news-
papers to earn revenue, infl uence politi-
cal discourse, and create regional identi-
ties led to many infl uential business per-
sons and politicians entering the private 
media after liberalisation.
These factors played a crucial role in 
creating the conditions of existence for 
the private media. This is an important 
argument, as private English-language 
newspapers would not have changed 
public discourse around reforms if they 
would were not positioned to benefi t 
from reforms. Kohli-Khandekar (2010) 
has charted the explosive growth in size 
and revenues of the private media after 
liberalisation.
Rhetoric and Economic Policies
Economic policies are debated, negotiat-
ed and implemented based on economic 
and political factors. Members of Parlia-
ment and bureaucrats tend to explain/
justify policies using rhetoric which is 
accessible to the public. There is a ten-
dency to use terms/words which evoke a 
certain meaning in the public imagina-
tion. In this sense, the Nehruvian state, 
social justice or Gandhian morals have 
a strong resonance with the public. A 
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popular narrative of policies is req uired 
by political ideologues to gain democrat-
ic support from the masses. Moreover, 
the government has to justify its policies 
to the masses and requires a grammar to 
do so. Economic independence and sac-
rifi ce for the betterment of the nation 
were popular rhetorical tropes to justify 
economic policies which did not benefi t 
the masses. Critiques of government pol-
icies have to engage with the tropes and 
arguments embedded in the public im-
agination.
Popular explanations of Indian eco-
nomic policies after independence were 
articulated by M K Gandhi, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, and Indira Gandhi. Each added 
different elements to what is now popu-
larly referred as “licence permit quota 
raj” (Times of India, 1 December 1989), 
“Nehruvian management of the Indian 
economy” (Hindu, 17 July 1991) or “so-
cialist” (Hindu, 2 April 1985) economic 
policies. Nehru had the broadest vision 
of the three. He envisaged setting up a 
developmental state, which would ac-
tively plan and work with the private 
sector to industrialise the country. 
There were two key elements in his 
plan: the control of resources by the 
state, to be channelled towards industri-
al investment with a long gestation peri-
od and to immunise the economy from 
foreign competition and fl uctuations in 
the global market. Gandhi was staunchly 
against a centralised state-led industri-
alisation model. However, some of his 
thinking was appropriated in a diluted 
form by the Nehruvian state discourse. 
These  included ideas about the impor-
tance of Indian cottage industry, of 
small-scale manufacture and having a 
moral purpose behind economic actions. 
Indira Gandhi brought her own twist to 
the narrative of the Nehruvian state 
when she came to power with Con-
gress(I) in the 1970s. Most importantly, 
she highlighted the plight of the poor, 
introduced redistributive economic poli-
cies and curbed powers of vested inter-
est groups. Overall, these set of policies 
comprised the popular understanding of 
Indian economic policies before liberali-
sation. These policies were justifi ed on 
the grounds that the two main economic 
roles of the state were to develop the 
economy and maintain political and 
economic freedom.
However, the mass media plays an 
 important role in interpreting and expl-
aining economic policies to their audi-
ence, in this case, the English-speaking 
citizenry of India. The media interprets 
policies by framing them within certain 
terms of debate. The frame provides the 
categories within which we understand 
an issue, it establishes the limits of the 
discussion and defi nes the range of 
problems that it can refer to. Tone, head-
line, quotations and placement of article 
within a paper have an important role in 
determining the framing of an article.
 The Approach
The media, which was mainly news-
papers in the 1980s, played an important 
role in setting the terms of debate for lib-
eralisation policies. I focus on English-
language national dailies, mainly  Hindu 
and Times of India, as these were the 
highest circulated English-language news-
papers. English-language newspapers are 
read by a small section of English-literate 
Indians, and newspaper articles cannot 
be considered representative of the peo-
ple of India. However, these  papers are 
hugely infl uential as they are read by a 
policy-infl uencing elite which include 
bureaucrats, professional classes, urban 
formal sector workers, and businessper-
sons. I have not surveyed business news-
papers and magazines even though they 
are an important part of the news paper 
landscape, as their readership is much 
lower than these two English dailies and 
the arguments about rhetoric in these 
newspapers are similar for other elite 
English-language publications. 
One short coming of this article is that 
it has not surveyed vernacular news-
papers, which will have very diffe rent 
politics of rhetoric and framing of liberal 
reforms. Readers can refer to  Rajagopal’s 
(2001) seminal work on under standing 
public discourse in the late 1980s and 
1990s in Hindi television shows to gain 
deeper insights into the political econo-
my of the vernacular media in  India in 
1991. I survey newspapers in years 
where new governments were elected 
and on days when budgets or economic 
surveys were presented. This includes 
1985, 1989, 1990 and 1991. I study arti-
cles about economic policy to extract the 
different kinds of arguments made 
about liberalisation and analyse how 
newspapers frame these arguments. I 
have not studied editorials and op-ed 
pieces as they refl ect the opinions of spe-
cifi c individuals or editors. News paper re-
ports are typically framed as objective 
pieces of information. 
This article studies newspaper reports 
to show that objective news pieces are 
framed to infl uence the reader. It argues 
that the framing and rhetoric of newspaper 
articles has consequences for the reader’s 
understanding of liberal reforms. The 
larger purpose will be to  ascertain whether 
there were any specifi c framing and 
rhetorical strategies utilised by newspa-
pers regarding libera lisation. The fol-
lowing sections will  provide a chrono-
logical history of the changing public 
discourse around reforms. This section 
has been presented in a chronological 
series to demonstrate that reforms did 
not have popular support amongst poli-
ticians and policy makers. Moreover, the 
introduction of reforms in 1991 was un-
expected for the larger masses and con-
tingent on certain circumstances.
The Context
After coming back to power in 1980, 
 Indira Gandhi had slowly been changing 
her rhetoric around economic policies. 
While, over the 1970s she targeted vest-
ed interest groups from the Nehruvian 
era which included: large corporations 
both Indian and foreign, former princes, 
 professional classes and formal sector 
employees, and pitched her policies as 
pro-poor and socialist (interpreted as 
state control of banks and heavy indus-
tries). Upon returning to power in 1980, 
she shed her earlier rhetoric and started 
arti culating the need for deregulation 
and partial reforms. Moreover, she started 
speaking about growth as an end in  itself, 
which was starkly different from the 
Nehruvian ideal that growth should trans-
late into industrial development and re-
distribution. At that time, this felt like lip 
service, but on hindsight, it would seem 
that Indira Gandhi was wary of Congress 
supporters who still held on strongly to 
the Nehruvian and Gandhian ideals. It 
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was easier for Rajiv Gandhi to speak the 
language of liberalisation as he was a 
young, foreign educated, working profes-
sional, and could be perceived as being a 
dynamic growth-oriented Prime Minister.
Rajiv Gandhi-led Government
When Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Min-
ister in 1985, there was a growing ex-
pectancy that he would be able to make 
bold changes that previous Congress 
governments had failed to do. Vishwanath 
Pratap (VP) Singh, who was Rajiv Gandhi’s 
fi nance minister at that time, presented 
his 1985 budget with high hopes amongst 
parts of the economic elite  expecting 
liberal reforms. However, V P Singh’s 
budget speech hardly made any refer-
ence to liberalisation and the overall 
 focus was on the “Need for structural 
changes to tackle the growing fi scal 
debt” (Hindu, 16 March 1985). Irrespec-
tive of intention, the V P Singh-led fi na-
nce ministry steered clear of talk about 
liberal reforms. However, on the same 
day, another article claimed that this 
budget “would take the country to the 
21st century” (Times of India, 21 March 
1985) and that “[T]he budget is an indi-
cation of the new government’s endeav-
our towards this direction [with  reference 
to liberal economic policies]” (insertion 
mine). V P Singh himself had given no 
indication publicly that structural cha-
nges would translate into liberal poli-
cies. The media, however, interpreted 
the fi rst budget of the Rajiv Gandhi-led 
govern ment as pro-liberalisation. This 
interpretation, was not made in a vacuum, 
and there was quite a strong contesta-
tion of liberalisation in public discourse. 
A few days after the budget, Hindu 
quoted a representative of the Con gress 
(Socialist) criticising the budget for 
having “given the go by to the objective 
of  socialism, and would lead to privati-
sation of the economy at the expense of 
the poor” (Hindu, 26 March  1985). This 
quote frames the terms of debate 
around liberalisation and privatisation 
as contradicting the objectives of social-
ism and leading to greater inequality. 
While the government itself did not di-
rectly talk about liberalisation in the 
budget, it did  respond to some of the 
criticisms  levelled against it.
V P Singh responded to this criticism 
in the Rajya Sabha a couple of days later, 
claiming that the “government was not 
deviating from the path of socialism fol-
lowed by the Congress government in 
the past.” He assuaged doubters saying 
that, “the budget sought to make basic 
structural reforms without deviating 
from the economic philosophy pursued 
so far.” He further “quoted from the 
speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru to show 
that his budget represented no depar-
ture from the concept of socialism”  (Hindu , 
28 March 1985). These quotes are high-
lighted to indicate that liberalisation 
was not consensually agreed upon in the 
1980s. In fact, there were fears of not 
getting legislative support for these poli-
cies even within the Congress. Singh 
was careful to label new policies as 
structural changes and was quick to 
clarify that these were not deviating 
from Nehruvian policies or socialism.
V P Singh-led Coalition
In December 1989, the Congress govern-
ment was dissolved. A new coalition 
government headed by Singh came to 
power. With Singh as Prime Mini ster, 
there were expectations of the govern-
ment continuing with the liberalisation 
process. However, Singh took an unex-
pected course and started disengaging 
himself from liberal reforms. Within a 
week of becoming Prime Minister, Singh 
congratulated the liberalisation meas-
ures taken by the previous government,
he hailed the steps taken by outgoing gov-
ernment (sic) to reduce controls, lift import 
restrictions and start dismantling the li-
cense permit quota raj … but he is quite clear 
that one cannot afford laissez faire. (Times 
of  India, 1 December 1989)
He distanced himself from expectations 
that his  government will be introducing 
other liberal reforms.
The Prime Minister’s comments are 
framed in the same paper along with an-
other article titled “Reverberations in 
global market after elections,” which 
questions the failure to introduce liberal 
policies. It states, “The questions gener-
ally have been whether political (sic) 
ambiance in India would affect the policy 
of liberalisation and freedom in the 
economy” (Times of India, 1 December 
1989). The article further qualifi es why 
the global market is concerned. It argues 
that “Several foreign investors from 
 diverse sectors of industry had been 
 attracted to India for the last decade or 
so, as a sequel to the liberation of the 
economy,” however, there is much more 
scepticism now that political uncertainty 
has slowed down the reform process. 
This article argues for liberalisation poli-
cies as they will bring in foreign inves-
tors, however, neither does it explain 
why foreign investment is good, nor 
does it evaluate the impact of liberal re-
forms on the economy. From the late 
1980s onwards, the media would frame 
the government’s failure to introduce 
liberal policies as political factors over-
riding economic factors. The media 
 reports argue that liberalisation makes 
sense in economic terms, while they 
rem ained completely silent about which 
classes would benefi t from liberalisation 
and what would be its macroeconomic 
and redistributive consequences.
The then Finance Minister Madhu 
Dandavate refrained from referring to 
liberalisation in his budget speech. He 
acknowledged the need for structural 
changes to negotiate the high fi scal defi -
cit and low foreign reserves in the econ-
omy. He, however, refused to confl ate 
structural changes with liberalisation. 
He said, “I am convinced that our people 
will make any sacrifi ce and meet any 
challenge in order to preserve economic 
independence and spirit of self reliance” 
(Hindu, 21 March 1990). Moreover, he 
justifi ed his budget saying that “his 
budget very much refl ected the socialist 
view point in that it tried to divert the 
money to poorer sections of society by 
taming the rich” (Times of India, 2 April 
1990). Dandavate rhetorically refers 
back to Nehruvian arguments of the im-
portance of self-reliance, economic inde-
pendence and socialism. He was acutely 
aware of the  necessity of structural 
changes to stem the increasing fi scal and 
current account defi cit. However, he did 
not confl ate structural changes with lib-
eralisation, although there was a clear 
demand for it from certain classes. It is 
hard to interpret whether Dandavate 
was actually against liberalisation or 
feared that his government would not 
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get political support for it. But he stuck 
to framing changes within the Nehruvi-
an discourse on economic policy.
Chandrashekhar-led Coalition
The V P Singh government stayed in  offi ce 
for a year after losing majority support 
in the legislature. It was  followed by a 
Chandrashekhar-led mino rity govern-
ment. This was a time of immense tur-
moil in the world economy with the Gulf 
Crisis, the dissolution of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, and religious tur-
moil in the country. This had been noted 
in the Economic Survey which reports 
“that this (referring to the crisis in the 
global economy) should warn us against 
being complacent with the likely 5% 
growth” (Times of India, 5 January 1991).
However, the Chandra shekhar gov-
ernment, not wanting to give up on its 
tenuous hold on the legislature, did not 
discuss structural changes of any kind, 
and went so far as to actively start tak-
ing an anti-liberalisation stance. Some 
of his noteworthy quotes in the newspa-
per were: “Chandrashekhar said plan-
ning has become more necessary to 
make optimal use of limited resources” 
(Times of India, 12 January 1991). And 
one titled “Liberalisation Catering to 
Small Section of Society” states that “the 
PM warns the country’s future will be 
mortgaged if liberalisation is  allowed in 
fi elds where resource is low” and rein-
states the importance of providing 
“autonomy to the public sector” (Times 
of India, 11 January 1991). 
In response to such statements, the 
media published  articles titled “India Is 
a Tiger Caged by Its Ideology” (Times of 
India, 9 January 1991), which quotes an 
international management professor 
from Kellogg Graduate School of Man-
agement, who questions whether India’s 
closed economy after 40 years has led to 
any signifi cant improvement in gross do-
mestic product. On the same day, in an 
article titled “Decentralise Industries, 
Says SEBI,” the Chairman of the Secu-
rities and Exch ange Board of India 
G V Ramkrishna asserts that “the bottom 
line of all business  enterprises should be 
profi t” (Times of  India, 19 January  1991). 
And that “businesses should not survive 
merely on  patriotism.” The media had 
started actively framing Chandrashek-
har’s critique of the unequalising effects 
of liberalisation, as the government’s 
 attempt to shackle the economy’s poten-
tial. There is no mention in newspapers 
about how there are clear gainers and 
losers from liberal policies, and how in the 
short run it will benefi t larger compa-
nies, industries and professional classes.
Narasimha Rao-led Government
The Chandrashekhar government dis-
solved in March 1991 without giving the 
slightest indication that liberal reforms 
could be introduced. A new coalition 
Congress government came to power 
headed by P V Narasimha Rao, and Man-
mohan Singh as fi nance minister. The 
new Congress government introduced 
liberal reforms. While the pace of intro-
duction was slow, their public discourse 
on economic policies changed. This 
changed discourse made the public 
aware of  liberal reforms and connected 
1991 to liberalisation. 
Within days of the new Congress 
govern ment being formed, the media 
was fl ush with a “call to open up the 
economy on all fronts” (Times of India, 
4 July 1991a), “to evolve a ‘minimum’ 
program acceptable to all to rejuvenate 
the economy of India” (Times of India, 4 
July 1991b), and to “adhere faithfully to a 
sound macro-economic discipline and 
implement fundamental structural re-
forms to strengthen their economic 
base” (Times of India, 16 July 1991). An 
increasing amount of space was given to 
speakers from institutions which were 
lobbying for liberal reforms, which in-
cluded the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) chief Micheal Landessen (Times of 
India, 16 July 1991), chairman of Tata 
Steel Russi Mody (Times of India, 23 July 
1991), pre sident of the Bombay Stock Ex-
change H M Kothari (Times of India, 2 
July 1991) and president of the Confedera-
tion of Indian Industry Dhruv Sawhney 
(Times of India, 4 July 1991a). Moreover, 
most articles considered structural change 
as apparent and framed the lack of liber-
alisation as political interest overriding 
economic acumen. The narrative around 
the lack of liberalisation was one in 
which vested interest groups, who had 
been profi ting from the licence raj, were 
resisting cha nges. The following is one 
amongst many articles which argues 
that the  opposition towards reforms is 
largely because
the political class, by and large, which is 
dominated by the Congress party would 
(sic) want to continue to have a say in an 
eco nomy as well as to retain its capacity to 
favour one indu strial house over another. 
(Hindu, 17 July 1991)
There were also intense discussions 
about the “loss of economic sovereignty” 
(Hindu, 24 July 1991), however this was 
recast as a debate based on economic 
merit not loss of economic autarky. The 
above article argues that “The resistance 
is understandable only when we view it 
from the perspective of political science. 
What the opponents of the (IMF) loan 
 resist is the loss of economic sovereignty 
that taking the IMF loans imply.” Such 
articles argued that economic sovereign-
ty is a noble aim foisted by our colonial 
past. The truth of the matter is that we 
live in a world where all economies are 
dependent on each other and we cannot 
ignore the benefi ts of this. Once again, 
liberalisation was treated as an objective 
solution to problems brought about by 
an increasingly interlinked global econ-
omy. Interestingly, there was a serious 
dearth of articles talking about the pos-
sible harmful repercussions of loans. 
The only critical article that I came 
across was nestled in the middle pages 
of the Hindu, following the day after the 
budget titled “Warning Note on the IMF 
Remedy” (Hindu, 20 July 1991). The article 
is fairly abstract and ends with a coun-
terfactual question “Even without such 
changes (reference to reforms) it may be 
diffi cult to say how the economy would 
have performed if the programme had 
not been implemented” (insertion mine).
Manmohan Singh took a different 
rhetorical approach from the fi nance 
ministers in previous years. Upon being 
selected as fi nance minister, he was 
quoted as saying that “India ready for big 
changes” and that “India has begun a 
fundamental shift in priorities that look 
(sic) for the fi rst time to South Korea and 
prosperous South Eastern nations as 
guiding economic symbols.” He further 
emphasised “essentially that the nation’s 
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elite must forgo their ‘ideological hang-
over’ because India has no viable option 
except to open its door to the West as 
well as Asia” (Times of India, 10 July 1991).
These were arguments to break the 
consensus around the Nehruvian ideals 
and justify reforms. It was pitched that 
this change is based on objective eco-
nomic judgment and the tendency to 
hold on to Nehruvian ideals of socialism 
and autarky is regressive, as it benefi ts a 
small political class which feeds off it. 
Liberali sation was pitched as freedom 
from government intervention and free-
dom to connect with the rest of the eco-
nomic world. Unlike previous fi nance 
ministers who always qualifi ed structural 
changes as being founded on Nehruvian 
ideals, Manmohan Singh went in a com-
pletely diffe rent direction by continu-
ously repeating the need for structural 
change. More over, he highlighted that 
“the thrust of the  reform process should 
be to increase  effi ciency and interna-
tional competitiveness of industrial pro-
duction” (Hindu, 22 July 1991). 
In his budget speech, Singh state that 
“Macroeconomic stabilisation and fi scal 
adjustment alone cannot suffi ce. They 
must be supported by essential reforms 
in economic policy and economic man-
agement as an integral part of the ad-
justment process” (Times of  India, 
24 July 1991). He also continuously cri-
tiqued failures of the Nehruvian state, 
distancing himself from these ideals. He 
said about reforms that they “would 
help to eliminate waste and ineffi ciency 
and impart a new element of  dynamism 
to growth processes in our economy.” 
The new buzz words introduced were 
growth, dynamism, competitiveness and 
stability which overthrew the older rhet-
oric of economic indepen dence, socia-
lism, equity and justice. This change in 
public discourse is highlighted by an arti-
cle which came out in the Hindu on the 
same day as the second budget proposed 
by Singh. The article refers to the break-
ing away from the Nehruvian discourse 
and commends the fi na nce minister for 
“taking the economy out of the woods 
and the entrepreneur out of the bureau-
cracy of the  ‘License Raj’ which replaced 
the British Raj.” Moreover, the writer sug-
gests that this budget will be appreciated 
by entrepreneurs as “this particular 
budget will be remembered because it is 
the fi rst change-oriented, strategic, more 
economic and less political budget.” He 
further referred to the death of Nehru-
vian rhetoric and pointed out that, “terms 
with political undertones such as ‘the 
 socialist, etc,’ have almost disappeared 
out of the bud get document” (Hindu, 31 
March 1992).
Another interesting thing to note is 
that, while there were articles critiquing 
reforms, they were all rhetorical not 
 analytical in nature. For example, one 
critical article from the Reserve Bank of 
 India (RBI) chief alleviated concerns by 
saying that “there will be no trail of 
 human suffering as a result of the 
 impending sweeping structural changes 
in the Indian economy” (Times of India, 
6 July 1991) and another titled “Bitter 
Pill as Soporifi c” confl ated market-biased 
orientation as “not equitable and leading 
to increasing inequality, as there are no 
anti-monopoly and anti-trust laws” (Times 
of India, 29 July 1991). Another article 
accused the “government of giving the 
go-by to the policies of Nehru” (Hindu, 
31 July 1991) and said that this “would 
lead to anarchy in the economic system. 
It will help multinationals but hurt the 
common man.” There were no articulate 
critiques of liberal reforms, no mention 
of the deleterious effects it had on South 
American economies, no mention of how 
the Asian tigers all grew without intro-
ducing structural reforms, very little ref-
erence to how structural  reforms tends 
to increase inequality and hurt the agri-
cultural economy. The newspapers did 
not frame a critique of reforms, instead 
dissidents spoke about a break away from 
Nehruvian ideals. This played into the 
hands of Singh and other proponents of 
liberalisation who argued for a need to 
change because of the different stage of 
development that India has reached and 
because the global context had changed.
Conclusions
The arguments around liberal reforms 
changed from 1985 to 1991. Liberalisa-
tion was perceived as a dilution of 
Nehruvian socialist policies and India’s 
economic independence in 1985. How-
ever, the growing fi scal and balance of 
payment crisis made the IMF loans and 
structural changes unavoidable. In bud-
get speeches in 1985, 1989 and 1990 the 
fi nance ministers were careful not to 
confl ate structural changes with liberal-
isation, as they expected a popular back-
lash against liberalisation, which were 
perceived as a break from Nehruvian 
statist policies.
As the size and infl uence of the pri-
vate media increased over the 1980s, 
English-language newspapers star ted ar-
guing and giving print coverage to argu-
ments justifying liberalisation. English-
language newspapers, through their 
articles, argued that economic policies 
should be based on economic analysis 
not political considerations, alluding to 
the fact that under the Nehruvian plan-
ning model, state intervention determined 
economic outcome. They also argued 
that liberalisation would attract foreign 
capital and investors who would contrib-
ute towards the growth of the economy. 
These arguments undermined the imp-
ortance of economic independence and 
self-reliance as a justifi cation for the 
Nehruvian state. The Congress govern-
ment in 1991 introduced liberal reforms, 
and Singh distinctly changed the rheto-
ric around reforms. He justifi ed struc-
tural change and reforms as a necessity 
in an increasingly interlinked world. He 
also distanced himself from the ideals of 
the Nehruvian state. English-language 
dailies in 1991 published articles cele-
brating liberal reforms introduced by 
Singh, and did not provide any arti-
culate critiques of reforms. This played 
an important role in gaining consent 
for  liberalisation amongst the English-
speaking elite.
The history of changing public dis-
course around reforms has been presented 
in a chronological order to demonstrate 
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that reforms were not introduced based 
on rational policy analysis or popular 
support. Rather, it was introduced as a 
consequence of changing circumstances 
in the global economy and within the In-
dian polity. Moreover, the decision to 
implement reforms was not a continuous 
process of discussion and  negotiation, 
but one mired in contingency and uncer-
tainty. The introduction of  reforms in 
1991 was not advertised to the larger 
voting masses, instead it was  marketed 
to a small elite economic class which 
would benefi t from it. News papers 
played an important role in convi ncing 
infl uential economic elite classes of the 
benefi ts of liberalisation, while also 
framing reforms in such a way that its 
harmful effects were silenced. 
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